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Abstrak: Hukum Islam di Negara Pancasila. Menurut al-Mâwardî dan Ibn Taymiyyah, konsep asal penerapan hukum 
Islam terletak pada kemestian adanya negara Islam. Tetapi, kenyataannya konsep negara Islam itu sendiri bervariasi dari 
waktu ke waktu. Maka, konsep yang final dan nyata tidaklah jelas wujudnya. Dengan kata lain, dapat dikatakan bahwa 
dalam praktiknya hukum Islam dapat diterapkan di manapun selaras dengan konteks sosio-kultural serta perkembangan 
dan kemajuan. Republik Indonesia adalah contoh yang baik bagaimana hukum Islam dapat diterapkan. Meski negara 
secara esensial tetap dalam kondisi sekuler, ide tentang penerapan syariah tidaklah secara ekstrem dilarang. Yang perlu 
dicatat adalah ide tersebut haruslah diperdebatkan dalam ranah publik, sehingga secara alamiah diketahui bahwa negara 
Pancasila memiliki batasnya sendiri untuk dapat mengakomodasi syariah di satu pihak, dan di pihak lain syariah sendiri 
merasakan keperluan adanya batasan tersebut dengan memperhatikan konteks Indonesia.
Kata Kunci: Pancasila, khilâfah, sekuler, perdebatan
Abstract: Islamic Law in the Pancasila State. According to al-Mâwardî and Ibn Taymiyyah the original concept of 
applying Islamic law lies on the existence of Islamic state. But, the concept of the Islamic state varies from time to 
time. Thus, the final and real concept always remains unclear. It can be said that in practical sense, Islamic law can be 
implemented anywhere in accordance with the socio-cultural context and its progress and development. The Republic 
of Indonesia is a good example of how shariah can be applied. Despite the State remaining relatively secular, in essence, 
the idea of the application of shariah is not strictly excluded. Nevertheless, these concepts should be debated in public 
until it is widely known that the Pancasila state is limited in accommodating shariah on the one hand and how shariah 
can be practised freely by the Indonesian Islamic society on the other.   
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Introduction
The discussion of the role of religion in the Pancasila 
State, the central function of Pancasila, the Constitution 
of 1945 as a social and national consensus, and their 
compatibility with Islam as well as the position of Islamic 
law within the framework of secular and national law 
is a never ending debate. It involves historical tensions 
between Islam and the ideology of nationalism, the 
continuing debate on the basis of the Indonesian 
state and the following competing interpretation of 
the function and role of Pancasila as the source and 
framework in the aplication of national law.  These 
interpretations and frameworks are viewed differently 
by people who have an Islamic orientation on the one 
hand and those come from purely secular view point 
on the other. 
 This article will review those points. It starts 
from the root of Islamic political thought on the 
supremacy of shariah, debate on the basis of Indonesian 
state, the contextualization and reinterpretation of 
Islamic legal principles of state and ends with options 
and future possibilities of mutual harmony.   
The Issue of Khilâfah and Nation-State
In the post-colonial era, the emergence of the 
nation-state concept in early twentieth century caused 
the Islamic world to reinforce and nuture the concept 
of Khilâfah. There are at least two main reasons of such 
phenomenon: (a) dogmatic and historical arguments 
of internally within Islamic society itself; and (b) the 
external reasons which are more of a situational response 
to the challenges of socio-political environments faced 
by the Muslim community in general.
Regarding the internal dogmatic and historical roots 
of Islam, there are at least four reasons for discussion. 
First, compared with patterns of thought of non-
Semitic prophets, Semitic prophets’ thought patterns 
were focused on efforts to accentuate and actualize the 
prophetic mission to the reality of history (history-
oriented accentuation). This orientation in turn inspires 
16 Ahkam: Vol. XII No.1 Januari 2012
a constant effort to bring the ideals of religious social 
ideals into various places and time of the real history 
of humanity.1 One of the very effective tools for the 
process of upholding the ideal goal is the legal tool.2
Second, similar to the categorisation of Moses and 
David, Prophet Muham-mad was categorized as ‘armed 
Prophet’. In geopolitical terms, the expansion and 
penetration of Islam took place vey rapidly. Within 
about 30 years after Islam was first introduced by the 
Prophet Muhammad in Mecca, and then Medina 
shortly afterwards, almost the entire Arabian Peninsula 
had been subjected under the banner of Islam.3 
Arguably such rapid expansion resulted in a variety 
of risks, socio-political and cultural tensions. To mini-
mize those risks and also to build a great, strong and 
sturdy empire, the development of a number of socio-
cultural mechanisms were necessary to enable the 
standardization of normative-constitutional references 
and the homogenization of an imperial jurisdiction. 
These objectives were accomplished quickly once a 
vocabulary and nomenclature of law was introduced.  
Third, not long after the death of Prophet Mu-
hammad there were bloody conflicts and internal 
frictions among the Companions. This friction culmi-
nated with the emergence of political strife between the 
faction of Companion ‘Utsmân ibn ‘Affân (died/killed 
yr. 35 Hijriyah/656 M) and the faction of Companion 
of ‘Alî ibn Abî Thâlib (killed yr. 40 H/661).
In the early stages, the conflict was essentially 
secular with alliances and political competition based 
on kinship lines and then sharpened by geographic 
polarization. Not long ater the conlict had started 
important religious symbols started to emerge. During 
this period, doctrines and the systematization of Islamic 
legal thought patterns formed as a result of missions 
that picked and chose those who could be called ‘true 
Muslims’, leaving the rest for classification as wrong 
Muslims (in-out-grouping process). 
Fourth, it was inevitable that a series of verses in the 
Quran itself revealed (qath‘î al-wurûd wa al-dalâlah) 
those missions to bring about change, not least changes 
in the field of law. Although the legal verses contained 
in the Quran only numbered around 500 verses, the 
1 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), Vol. 1, p. 117-118; Nurcholish 
Madjid, Islam: Doktrin dan Peradaban, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000). 
2 Compare, Lawrence M. Friedmann, The Legal System: A Social 
Science Perspective, (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1975); 
Compare, Lawrence M. Friedmann, Law and Society, (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1977); W. Friedmann, Legal Theory, (London: Steven 
& Sons, 1953). 
3 Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
(Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1988), h. 5: Joseph Schacht, 
The Origin of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1953), p. 15.
style of language and juridical implications expressed 
a  normative substances in  candid, firm and even 
axiomatic manner. In other words, it is almost as if those 
verses were to assert the existence of legal certainty.4
Indications of the juridical imperative within the 
verses also can be interpreted positively.  That is, the 
Quran carries messages that are fundamental to legal 
constructs, such as: upholding the rule of law (legal 
Supremacy); all people are equal before the law (equality 
before the law), ethnocentric and tribal relative bonds 
are subjected to principles of legal certainty; and there is 
no crime unless there is a sanction and punishment.5      
That said, it doesn’t seem surprising that the fu-ture 
direction is the victory of the Islamic legalists: Islamic 
thoughts about morality, power systems and procedures 
are defined within the boundaries of Islamic law. In 
the Sunnî tradition, these thoughts are represented by 
two ideas of governance and moral authority of Islam; 
the thoughts of al-Mâwardî (975-1058) in his work, 
namely al-Ahkâm al-Sulthâniyyah, and ideas of Ibn 
Taymiyyah (1263-1328) in his work, namely al- Siyâsah 
al-Syar‘iyyah.6
In summary, both assert the supremacy of Islamic 
law over political leadership. The political leadership 
(Caliphate/Imamate) was implemented to replace 
and maintain the prophetic function of religion (al-
khalifah mawdhû’ah li harâsuhal al-dîn.7   As such, 
political leadership’s role is to uphld the principles of 
the shariah.  
Entering into the curent era of the nation-state, 
strong interrelationshps and metamorphosis between 
political power and shariah is still ongoing. The 
emergence of the terms Dâr al-Islâm (Islamic state), 
Dâr al-Harb (state of war), and Dâr al-Salâm (peaceful 
state) for example, are direct or indirect manifestation 
s of the symbolic continuity of thoughts and works 
realised by al-Mâwardî and Ibn Taymiyyah.
By the early twentieth century and in line with the 
weakening of the Islamic intellectualism ethos and the 
strengthening of penetration of cultural, economic and 
political challenges brought about by new European 
trade missions and imperialism, the Ottoman empire 
which carried the spirit of pan-Islamism (caliphate) 
4 Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, (McGill In-
stitute for Islamic Studies, 1998), p. 5-15.  
5 Wael, B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, h. 5-15.
6 See, Montgomerry Watt, Islamic Political Thought, (Edinburg 
University Press, 1980); Bassam Tibi, Ancaman Fundamentalisme: 
Rajutan Islam Politik dan Kekacauan Dunia Baru, (Yogyakarta: Tiara 
Wacana), p. 3-7; 20-24.
7 Muhammad al-Zuhaylî, Târîkh al-Qadhâ fi al-Islâm, (Damascus, 
Dâr al-Fikr al-Mu‘âshir, 1999), p. 423-436; Colin Imber, Ebus Suud: 
The Islamic Legal Tradition, (Edinburg University Press, 1997), p. 
3-64; Subhî Mahmassanî, Falsafah al-Tasyri fi al-Islam, transl. Farhat J. 
Ziadeh, (Leiden: EJ.Brill, 1961), p. 39-46.
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collapsed and its decline was a turning point (in 1922 
M).8
The collapse of the Islamic caliphate system and 
the extreme difficulty in resurrecting such a system - 
despite various attempts - immediately raises two issues: 
(a) from geopolitical perspective, the collapse of the 
Islamic Ottoman caliphate system was the beginning of 
the caliphate antithesis under the spirit of geographical 
patriotism concepts within Islamic society itself; (b) 
this geographical patriotism gradually transformed into 
a spirit of nationalism and national sovereignty vis-a-vis 
the sovereignty of foreign countries (colonial). Under 
the theme of nationalism, the Islamic community will 
resort to the symbols, the contract and a new consensus 
within the nation-state as the antithesis of religion, or as 
the antithesis of nation-states which are bound by rigid 
Islamic law.
Under the nation-state ties, communities inevitably 
prefer define themselves by a sense of solidarity or with 
a sense of national communalism and sacrifice as part of 
the geographical patriotism bond. In a nation-state, the 
symbols of primordial ethno-religion ways are restricted 
to the level of life that are private and are not allowed to 
manifest in the public domain (public sphere).9
In the real-praxis of the Islamic community 
after the caliphate system, this situation has serious 
implications10. Among those implications is the 
growing marginalization of the actualization of shariah 
in public life, the more alienated feeling of communal 
religiousness and sense of lacking collective historical 
memory about victories of the past great dynasties of 
shariah (Islamic empire). In fact, such psycho-historical 
experiences have made the community of Islam feel 
giddy in the situation and this has urged the necessity 
of finding a new identity. This new identity results in 
community members acting in defensive, apologetic and 
more assertive ways, particularly related to the symbols, 
glory, and the continuity of the Islamic empire.11
Islam versus Colonialism: Islamic Law as a Symbol 
of Native Struggle
In the context of the shariah implementation 
in Indonesia, there are two relevant periods during 
the Dutch colonial period. First, the period prior to 
1800, whereby the Indonesian archipelago was heavily 
8 Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism, (Berkeley: 
Berkeley Univ. Press, 1983): Gershoni and Jankowski, “Egypt and the 
Caliphate Question, 1924-1926“ in Egypt, Islam and the Arabs, p. 74.
9 Bassam Tibi, Ancaman Fundamentalisme, p. 3-7; 20-24. 
10 Michael F. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: 
The Umma Below the Wind, (London and New York: Routledge & 
Curzon, 2003).
11 For comparison, see: Talal Asad, Rethinking About Secularism and 
Law in Egypt, (Leiden: ISIM, 2001).
influenced by the colonial power trading cartel named 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) or the Dutch 
East India Company. Second, the period of military-
political power of the Dutch government after 1800.
In the first period, the VOC’s political stance toward 
the shariah exhibited these characteristics: First, Dutch 
tolerance of Muslim faith resulted in a relatively large 
space for the practices to thrive amongst several kingdoms 
of the archipelago. Second, the Dutch were slowly 
trying to understand the precise the nature of Islamic 
law and customary law. Third, the agenda and process 
of legal westernization. Above all, the implementation 
or influence of shariah was undertaenken gradually 
and where possible did not affect the interests of trade 
between the Dutch and the natives.12
By the time of the second period, Dutch attitudes 
towads Islam chaned drastically. The Dutch colonial 
government had started to take an aggressive political 
stace to exclude Islamic law in a more systematic manner 
in the following way. First, it directly confronted 
Islamic law with customary law. Second, it increased 
its westernization efforts even converting natives to 
Christianity. Third, it intensified its somewhat massive 
process of colonialism in various fields.13 
Since legal cases during this time were closely related 
to daily colonial life, in legal policy terms - particularly 
with regard to Islamic law - the Dutch colonial 
governments always searched for an appropriate legal 
political formula. Thus, its colonial interests were 
maintained on the one hand while on the other hand, 
a long-term objective to westernize Indonesian law was 
also run systematically.
With such framework, there arose two approaches 
throughout the colonial period above.14 First, the 
political approach to law adopted the receptie complexu 
formula. This approach was conceived and implemented, 
especially in the first period of colonial rule by Solomon 
Keyser and later enhanced by Christian van den Berg 
(1845-1927).  The purpose of this approach was, 
particularly in the civil law, for the colonial government 
to implement a policy that the applicable law of each 
religion and its followers was not based on customary 
law. Muslims implemented Islamic law, Christians 
applied their canon law, and so on.
To enshrine this approach into law, the Staatsblad No. 
22 Article 13 was enacted, which in essence preserved 
12 Moh. Koesnoe, "Perbandingan antara Hukum Islam, Hukum 
Eropa dan Hukum Adat", Workshop on Curriculum Counseling on 
Islamic law in universities, Yogyakarta, 11-12 Januari 1982.
13 Mohammad Mahfud MD (ed.), Peradilan Agama dan Kompilasi 
Hukum Islam dalam Tata Hukum Indonesia, (Yogyakarta; UII Press, 
1993), p. 58.
14 Sajuti Thalib, Receptio a Contrario, (Jakarta; Bina Aksara), 1985, 
p. 6. 
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customary or adat law by allowing the govrnment to 
recognise and consider some aspects of Islam, especially 
in relation to marriage, division of property inheritance 
and so on.
Second, the political approach to the law by the 
receptie formula. This approach was conceived by 
Cristiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) and then 
it was further systemized by C. van Vollenhoven and 
Terr Haar. The core approach of this formula was that 
religious law (Islam), especially in the areas of civil law, 
could only be applied if the law had been absorbed 
and become customary law. Islamic law which had not 
become cus-tomary law could not be applied.
Political observers of colonial law state that Hur-
gronje’s conclusion was based on his observations of the 
applicable law in Aceh. For Hurgronje, applicable law 
in Aceh was not true of Islamic law but the law of Islam 
which had been accepted by local custom. Therefore, 
as that law had been accepted locally as customary law 
then the Islamic law would be applied.15
Hurgonje himself had in the past, served as an 
advisor to the colonial government. Hurgronje in 
general also suggested the existence of a basic policy 
related to Islam. The essence of this policy was that 
the colonial government should separate the aspects of 
ritual, social (legal) and political Islam. For pure aspects 
of Islamic rituals, such as prayer and pilgrimage, the 
Dutch East Indies government gave freedom to the 
followers of Islam from among the natives; they were 
given the freedom to run their worship. In fact, if 
deemed necessary, the Dutch East Indies government 
would facilitate the means of the ritual.16 
Meanwhile, for the activities that were closely related 
to socio-political activities, the colonial government 
had to be careful, cautious and selective. Islamic civil 
laws, for example, could not be applied unless those 
laws had been absorbed and become customary law. 
Furthermore, regarding the political aspect, the colonial 
government could not neglect the overseeing of various 
activities and limit the agenda of Indonesian Muslims 
which contained substantial Islamic political content, 
especially related to the theme of pan-Islamism.
The Dutch policy to marginalize Islamic law was a 
sharp policy. Resistance against Islam in order not to 
be a political vehicle seemed a rational decision. Thus, 
George Mc. T. Kahin explained that Muhammad’s 
religion is not only a chain that ties the social unity, 
15 John R. Bowen, Islam, Law and Equality in Indonesia: An 
Anthropology of Public Reasoning, (Cambridge (UK) and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
16 Aqib Suminto, Politik Islam Hindia Belanda, (Jakarta; LP3ES, 
1985); Harry J. Benda, “Christiaan S. Hurgronje and the Foundation 
of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia” in Journal of Modern History, 
30, 1958. 
but it is a common symbol of faith (ingroup) against 
foreign invaders and oppressors who come from other 
religions.17 Furthermore, Fred R. Von der Mehden 
analyzed that Islam is the most obvious means to build 
a sense of national unity and to distinguish the people 
of Indonesia from Dutch colonizers. The islands that 
include the Dutch East Indies never existed as a unified 
linguistic, cultural or historical whole. The last regions 
to fall into the Netherland’s power never fully subjected 
to until the early 20th century. Therefore, because it 
consisted of a variety of historical traditions, linguistic, 
cultural, and different geographical forms, then the only 
universal bond available, outside the colonial power, 
was Islam.18
Later history proved that the approach and suggestions 
of Hurgronje’s receptie contributed immense influences 
on the policies and continuity of the Dutch East Indies 
government in Indonesia, especially in dealing with the 
issue of Islamic law and politics.
Shariah, Ideological Crystallization, and
Antagonism 
As evidenced by the history of the nationalist 
movement in Indonesia, Islam-as mentioned above-
played an important role in the process of national 
integration to encourage the creation of political 
entities in Indonesia. However, in later development, 
in line with the dynamic interaction between societal 
subcultures of Indonesia, the ideological roots and the 
spirit of anti-imperialism contextually evolved and 
experienced a metamorphosis. Thus, prior to Indonesian 
independence, three basic elements of anti-imperialism 
ideologies emerged: Islam, nationalism, and socialism.19
The Islamic ideological defenders aspired to the 
realization of Indonesia to become an independent 
state based on Islam. At the same time, defenders of 
nationalism and socialism hoped that Indonesia’s 
independence could be sustained by their ideology. The 
debate continued. The landscape of this antagonism 
polarised people into defenders of Islamism and 
secularism: Muslim groups insisted on Islamism 
while the other two groups standing on the logic of 
secularism.
At the practical level, to realize the socio-political 
aspirations, Islamic groups were represented by various 
social organizations and political parties, such as 
Syarekat Islam (SI), Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia 
17 George Mc.T.Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 
(Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1952), p. 38
18 Fred R. von der Mehden, “Islam and the Rise of Nationalism 
in Indonesia,” Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1957, 
p. 34.
19 Mc T. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 38.
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(Masyumi) or Indonesia Muslims High Assembly, 
Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and others. 
While the nationalist groups were represented by Budi 
Utomo movement, and political parties such as Partai 
Nasional Indonesia (PNI) or the Indonesian National 
Party and the left-social-democrat groups were 
represented by Indische Sociaal Democratic Vereniging 
(ISDV), Communist Party of Indonesia, the Indonesian 
Socialist Party and Others.20
In such polarization, it would not be surprise 
that before and after independence of Indonesia, the 
debates about the fundamental pillars of statehood and 
nationhood, such as the basic state constitution, have 
been also dominated by the theme of Islamism and 
secularism.
Quantitatively, looking at the proponents for each 
cause, then the largest constituent of the two groups 
were almost equally divided between Islamists and 
secularists. The results of the first General Elections 
(1955), indicated this; six Islamic Parties obtained 45% 
of the total number of votes, the Indonesian Nationalist 
Party (PNI) obtained 22% and the Communist Party 
of Indonesia obtained 15% votes. The remaining votes 
were obtained by several smaller parties that were closer 
to the secular stance (13%).21
As briefly mentioned above, among the hotly 
debated themes before and after independence in Badan 
Pe-nyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(BPUPKI) or the Investigation Agency for Preparation 
of Indonesian Independence and the Constituent 
Assembly was a matter of basic state constitution. The 
debate on this theme, in turn, would largely determine 
the pattern of the relationship between religion (Islam/
Islamic law) and the state.22
The debate about the country’s basic theme 
addressed by the respective ideological proponent was 
faced with absolute terms and perspectives. In other 
words, the Islamist groups emphasized the absolute 
state linked and fused with religion, while on the other 
hand the secular groups emphasized the absolute state 
separated from religion. Because each one was at the 
extreme opposites, the discourse and the formation of 
the Indonesia state which was based on the spirit of 
anti-colonialism towards the establishment of a nation-
state became exhausting and drained the socio-political 
20 Robert van Neil, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, 
(The Hague and Bandung; W. van Hoeve, 1960); A.K. Pringgodigdo, 
Sejarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia, (Jakarta; Pustaka Rakyat, 1950); 
Ruth Mc Vey, The Comintern and the Rise of Indonesian Communism, 
(Ithaca; Cornell university, 1961).
21 Alfian, Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1955 untuk DPR, (Jakarta; 
Leknas, 1971).
22 Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Piagam Djakarta 22 Juni 1945, 
(Bandung; Pustaka Salman ITB, 1981).
energy from each of these groups.   
Amid the continuing debate on the basic ideology of 
the country, before the proclamation of independence, 
in fact a compromise on the basis of the state already 
reached. The compromise states that the state is based 
on five principles: (1) Belief in God Almighty with the 
oblgation of Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic 
shariah; (2) Humanity that is Just and civilized; (3) 
Unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy guided by the inner 
wisdom of deliberation/representation; (5) Social justice 
for all Indonesian people. The deal was later called the 
Djakarta Charter.
Although formally the agreement on the Djakarta 
Charter has been reached, but before the charter was 
enacted, an objection to the first principle had been 
raised.  The objection was that all “words” following 
“Belief in Gold Almighty” be removed. Through 
informal consultations with some Muslim leaders led by 
Mohammad Hatta, the compromise on the abolition of 
those remaining words was settled.    
The continuing ‘negotiation’ and interpretation that 
followed since the settlement of the Djakarta Charter 
later spawned a variety of polarizations of discourses 
and even introduced its own complexity, to determine 
the relationship between Islam and the state model 
that can be accepted by all groups and children of the 
nation.23 
Finally, the ‘objectionable’ words were deleted with 
the consensus that after the first General Election 
(1955), it could be discussed again in the Constituent 
Assembly which would be formed based on the results 
of the election.
The debate about the basic state ideology and the 
Jakarta Charter repeated once again. Furthermore, after 
the Constituent Assembly met for approximately three 
years, the country’s basic problem was not finished 
thoroughly.24 
Bahtiar Effendy describes how the differences in 
concept continued until the Constituent Assembly 
(1956-1959):
“... Islamic groups essentially restated their aspirations 
of political ideology that they had put on the pre-
independence, namely establishing a state that is clearly 
based on Islam. They proposed that Islam to be the state 
23 Deliar Noer, Administrasi Islam di Indonesia, Rajawali; Yayasan 
Risalah, 1983; Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, (Jakarta; 
Pustaka Uama Grafiti, 1987), p. 44-47; Allan Samson, ”Indonesian Islm 
since the New Order” in Reading on Islam in Souteast Asia, compiled by 
A. Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussein, (Singapore; ISEAS, 
1985), p. 167; A. Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan; Studi 
tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante, (Jakarta; LP3ES, 1987).
24 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: Studi 
tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987; Endang 
Saifuddin Anshari, Piagam Djakarta 22 Juni 1945, (Bandung: Oustaka 
Salman, 1981).
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ideology based on the arguments concerning: (1) 
the holistic nature of Islam, (2) superiority of Islam 
over all other ideologies, and (3) the fact that Islam is 
embraced by the majority of citizens of Indonesia”.25
“... Several other groups reject the notion of Islam 
as the state under consideration possibility to be 
applied. Considering the fact that Indonesian society 
is heterogeneous in socio-religious life, they doubt 
that Islam can serve as an ideological-political world 
view for the entire community. Meanwhile, the 
Pancasila, however imperfect, has been proved to be 
the common ideological basis of the entire people of 
Indonesia. Other circles rejected Islam as the state on 
the grounds that they were worried that Islamic laws 
would apply to all citizens of Indonesia”26          
The Decree of President Soekarno was issued in 
1959 to stop the polemic by asserting the need to 
return to the Pancasila and Constitution of 1945. The 
decree also notes that “Jakarta Charter, dated June 22, 
1945 animates Constitution of 1945 is an integral 
part of the constitution”.
The enactment of the Decree for the defenders of 
Islamic ideology was a disappointing political defeat, 
particularly in relationd to the implementation of the 
shariah agenda. Symptoms of political discontent was 
manifested by Kartosuwiryo Movement in West Java, 
Daud Berueh in Aceh or Kahar Mudzakkar in South 
Sulawesi for instance, igniting certain shariah based 
emotional responses as a central theme and focal 
point of the struggle.27 
The failure of the implementation of the Jakarta 
Charter also gave rise to negative sentiment among 
Muslims against the state. Furthermore, the dialectic, 
the tension and conflict between the pro-Islamic and 
counter-shariah continued to occur throughout the 
Old Order. The collapse of the Old Order regime in 
1966 and subsequent rise of the New Order does not 
remove the map of history at all. So far, it continues 
until now.
Seeking the Middle Path: the Islamization of 
Pancasila?
Tensions between Islam and the state in early New 
Order (1966) did not abate. Each group stays with 
25 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan 
Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 
107.
26 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara, p. 109.
27 See, C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The 
Darul Islam in Indonesia, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981); 
Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik: Kasus 
Darul Islam Aceh, (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1990); Anhar Gonggong, 
Abdul Qahhar Muzakkar: dari Patriot Hingga Pemberontak, (Jakarta: 
Grasindo, 1992). 
the current agenda and the interests of each. Islamic 
groups are adamant in demanding the restoration of 
the Djakarta Charter, while the power of the state 
held that the matter does not need to be responded 
seriously. The State still considered that the agenda 
of reviving the Djakarta Charter was an agenda to 
open up pandora’s box of old wounds and horizontal 
conflicts interferring with national integration.  
Tension between Islam and the state in the New 
Order peaked by the eve of the legalization of the 
Draft Law of Marriage in the 1970’s. The spirit of 
the marriage bill proposed by the government was 
to place marriage as a civil marriage irrespective of 
religious law.
The political power of Islam, especially as 
represented by the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(PPP) or United Development Party, saw the draft 
as a systematic and serious attempt of New Order to 
marginalize and erase Islamic law. When the draft 
was being discussed in the House of Representatives 
(DPR), there was a massive demonstration of Muslims 
rejecting it outright.
Although an agreement was later reached with 
some revisions of the draft law and Law. 1 of 1974 
on Marriage was issued, the tension and mutual 
suspicion between the Islamists and the state 
lingered. On the one hand, there was a stereotypical 
impression attached to the government that Muslims 
are anti-Pancasila, anti-pluralism and national unity. 
Meanwhile, on the other hand, Muslims have always 
felt that the government has a hidden agenda to 
marginalize Islamic law and haunted by the fear of 
the rise of Islamic forces.         
The tension began to ease by the 1980s. In 
the current period, the regime showed a more 
accommodative treatment to the socio-cultural 
and political interests of Islam. According to some 
observers, this accommodation would not have 
happened without the emergence and the role of 
“cultural Islam”. “Cultural Islam” is the positive 
impact of the renewal of Islamic thought in Indonesia 
that began in the early 1970s under the influence of 
figures such as: Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish 
Madjid, KH Ahmad Siddiq, Dawam Rahardjo, etc.28 
The direct impact of the emergence of cultural 
Islam is the birth of a new approach to the Islamic 
development process, especially after the Pancasila was 
accepted as the basis of ideology and the aspiration 
28 Masykuri Abdillah, Demokrasi di Persimpangan Makna; 
Respons Intelektual Muslim Indonesia Terhadap Konsep Demokrasi 
(1966-1993), (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1999).
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to raise the Djakarta Charter and the strengthening 
of Islamic political parties (Islam yes, Islamic party 
no!). Within the framework of cultural Islam, Islam 
or the Muslim community was no longer be viewed 
as a threat to the existence of the state ideology. Thus, 
Pancasila could be seen as the practical continuation 
of interpretation of Islam. 
As a result of the emergence of such an atmosphere, 
the Religious Judicature Act of 1989 was enacted, 
which gave the Islamic Courts a strong legal position. 
Furher solidifying the position of Islam in Indonesia, 
the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI) 
or Association of Islamic Intellectuals of Indonesia 
in 1990, the emergence of a Presidential Instruction 
to disseminate Kompilasi Hukum Islam (KHI) or 
the Compilation of Islamic Law was issued in 1991, 
the manager of zakat or Badan Amil Zakat (BAZIS) 
was officially appointed in 1993, and Indonesia’s first 
Islamic bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) was 
founded in 1992.
Islamic Legal Logics to Accept Pancasila
The State is often concepualised as the highest 
organization formed, established and jointly 
safeguarded and maintained by people in an area that 
has a common goal. At the legal level, the necessary 
conditions for the establishment of a state are: (a) 
There are people; (b) There is a geographic region; 
(c) There is a reign; (d) There is an international 
recognition.
These requirements are minimal and formalistic. 
However, those formal requirements cannot 
necessarily be realized without a common desire for 
continuous struggle that is integrated and maintained 
as a social consensus (consensus/social contract). 
Thus, some experts say that the subject matter of a 
country that can not be denied is the existence of 
a common “social contract”. In the spirit of “social 
contract”, basic norms (grundnorm), technical norms 
and intermediary norms will be formed: a vision, 
constitution, rules, and other commitments bonds. It 
is probable-and certain-that a “social contract” often 
cannot be made once and for all. On the contrary, 
its formulation undergoes the process of attraction, 
fluctuation and sometimes steep streets that lead to 
violence and physical conflicts. The debate about 
the basic ideology of the state (as discussed above), 
the accompanying excesses and the resulting psycho-
political frictions are some of the main examples and 
illustrations.
In the Islamic concept a definite and fixed concept 
of nationhood is not found. Therefore, there are many 
views, perspectives and opinions about how it should 
develop the model and form of the state, such as the 
interpretation of the caliphate mentioned above. All 
opinions and views are intrinsically ijtihâdî (rational 
effort); it can be adjusted, modified and formatted 
in accordance with the principle of the temporal and 
local benefits.29          
As such, the nature of the relationship between 
Islam and the State in Indonesia is essentially dynamic. 
Islam remains autono-mous and independent, as a 
religious doctrine. The state also remains autonomous 
and independent as a social organization that shares a 
common thread with all its citizens indiscriminately. 
However, although both are autonomous with the 
tasks and their res-pective regions, the dynamics of 
history, the idea of  interaction (social contract), the 
constellation of ideas and political and sociological 
require them to be, like it or not-an entity that can 
not be separated diametrically and antagonistically: 
dealing or negate each other.
In other words, based on the experience of sta-
tehood before the founding of the Republic of 
Indonesia (NKRI) and after independence (partly as 
already mentioned above), then the Unitary Republic 
of Indonesia cannot become the Religion State, and 
at the same time might not be a Secular State.30 
Why is it that Indonesia cannot becomee an 
Islamic state? There are several reasons, among them. 
First, Islam itself is not explicitly and rigidly (qath’î) 
gives an indication of the definitive form of the state. 
Second, some countries that have declared themselves 
formally as religion states (Islam), in fact in many 
practices of such states as well as legal systems, 
political, and their economic values are far from 
Islam itself. Instead of being a pilot and Islamic state 
models, they actually become countries filled with the 
dirty law practices and politics. Third, the wisdom of 
the history of the Muslim nationalists who became 
the founders of Republic of Indonesia (founding 
fathers) have provided a good grounding for future 
generations that continue the struggle of Islam per 
se and can not only carry the name of Islam (form) 
but more importantly need to fight for the content 
(substance). Not just a flag for Islam but resolving real 
29 Compare, Majid Khadduri, Mafhûm  al-‘Adl fi al-Islâm, (Dâr 
al-Hashd, 1998). 
30 See and compare, Moh. Mahfud MD, Hukum dan Pilar-
pilar Demokrasi, (Yogya: Gema media, 1999); Moh. Mahfud MD, 
Demokrasi dan Konstitusi di Indonesia, (Yogya: Liberty, 1993); 
Konstitusi dan Hukum dalam kontroversi Isu, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 
2010). 
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issues and finding  concrete solutions. Fourth, by giving 
the name of an Islamic state (as in some countries), 
Islam is often only used as a political tool and not a 
frame of reference for  ideal rights, morals, practices 
of social norms and state. The virtues of religion are 
often contaminated with pollutants and vested interests 
that are not noble. Thus, acute internal conflicts arise 
precisely because they are burdened with the hijacking 
the name of religion. In fact, sublime values, norms and 
behaviors should be the main mission. 
Why is Indonesia unlikely to remain a secular 
state? There are several reasons, among them. First, the 
historical, social, juridical aspirations from a country 
(state) are a continuation of the historical, social, 
juridical aspirations at the level of the community 
(society). In other words, if what is alive in the minds 
and souls of the people/society (volksgeist) is not 
embodied in the state rules, then the country will not 
survive for long or the country stands on the principle 
of dictatorship and totalitarianism. If the growing 
aspiration and mainstream is the aspiration of Islam, 
then the state should be in light of Islamic values. 
Thus, if the Muslim community can be well organized, 
that will automatically give birth to an Islamic ‘social 
technology’. Second, social and legal character of 
Indonesian society is religiously true. Therefore, once 
the people of Indonesia are drawn into the secular 
extreme pendulum, then the collective response of this 
nation will come up with extreme religious language. 
Thus, the present secular extremism will only provoke 
religious extremism. Third, the global trend is moving 
towards spiritual awakening. Universally, there are 
indications that humans are increasingly recognizing the 
needs for and strengthening the spiritual dimensions in 
life. Fourth, there is a juridical bond which is layered 
like a spiral and staircase (stufenbau) in the system of 
the government and Indonesia is not possible to be 
secular. That is starting from the Constitution (article 
29 of the Constitution of 1945), and other related 
articles, until the technical rules to accommodate and 
ensure institutional aspirations of Islam (the Ministry 
of Religion, Religious Courts, Law on Zakâh, Waqf, 
Islamic Bank), etc.
The Model of Integrating Islamic Law in Pancasila 
State 
The existence of the Republic of Indonesia with the 
philosophy of Pancasila, the Basic Law (Constitution) of 
1945, the motto of Unity in Diversity, is an agreement 
that binds all elements of the nation. Therefore, it is 
obligatory for Muslims, who happened to be citizens of 
the majority, to keep the deal from the efforts of treason 
and secession (separatism).31 This is the conclusion of 
almost every sesiion of dialogue between Indonesian 
Muslims and National Leaders. 
In the study of continuity and validity of a value 
in society, it is taught that a value (including religious 
values) will remain in force and be a guide, when the 
value has four actual relevant grounds: philosophical, 
sociological, juridical, and historical grounds. The rule 
of value applies philosophically, when it is relevant and 
in accordance with the ideals of law as the primary value 
of the highest world views (Weltanschauung). The rule 
of value applies juridically, if the determination is based 
on the principle on higher level (stufenbau) or formed 
on a predetermined basis. The rule of value applies 
sociologically, if there is a recognition of the community 
of the rule (Sociological Jurisprudence schools) and/
or the enactment of rule is imposed by the authorities 
referred to, although it is not accepted by the citizens of 
the community (the theory of power). The rule of value 
applies historically, when it is in accordance with the 
functions and roles of this rule that has been fused and 
integrated within a historical collective memory.32 
In the context of Indonesian society, if studied in 
depth, in order that the value can function well then 
every rule must meet the four pillars of relevance as 
mentioned above, because: (1) when it applies only 
philosophically, it is likely that legal rule is something 
that is only aimed (ius constituendum ); (2) if the rule 
applies only juridically, then there is the possibility that 
the rule is the dead rule; (3) If it only applies a sociological 
theory in the sense of power, then the rule becomes the 
enforced rule; and (4) when it applies only historically, 
then the rule probably does not fit the context and 
development of Indonesianness (keindonesiaan). 
Historically and philosophically, the role of Islam 
in Indonesia cannot be denied. As discussed in the 
previous pages, the historical role of Islam in founding 
and establishment of Indonesia is very large. Anti-
colonialism doctrine, philosophy of life to eradicate the 
tyranny and oppression of the imperialist contributed in 
raising the spirit heroic sacrifice through the movement 
of various organizations, and society.
On the other hand, sociologically and juridically, 
Islam as a source of value and the law has become a fact 
and reality. Thus, it seems reasonable if Mohammad 
Daud Ali in clarifying article 29 of the Constitution of 
1945 paragraph (1) of the Republic of Indonesia that 
31 See and compare, K.H. Maruf Amin, Harmoni dalam 
Keberagamaan: Dinamika Aktual Relasi Agama-Negara, Dewan 
Pertimbangan Presiden Bidang Hubungan Antar Agama, 2011.
32 Reza Banakar and Max Travers (Editors), An Introduction to 
Law and Social Theory, (Oxford-Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2002); Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory, p, 1-318, (Harvard 
University Press, 2004). 
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is based on the Belief in God Almighty, is interpreted 
as follows: First, in the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) 
shall not occur or apply anything contrary to the rules 
of Islamic law for Muslims, or are contrary to the 
principles of Christianity for Christians, or are contrary 
to the rules of the Hindu-Bali for the people of the 
Hindu-Balinese, or contrary to morality Buddhism for 
Buddhists. That means in Indonesia there may not be 
applicable or enforced laws that are in conflict with the 
norms (laws) of religions and morality of Indonesia.
Second, Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia 
(NKRI) shall execute Islamic law for Muslims, Christian 
law for Christians, and  Hindu-Balinese laws for Hindu-
Balinese people. In order to run the Shari’ah it requires 
the mediation of state power. The significance of this 
second interpretation is: NKRI shall provide to the 
law of the religions professed by the Indonesian nation 
can be accomplished throughout the implementation 
of religious laws that require the aid of power or state 
officials. That is, the state is obliged as organizers to 
run shariah (religious laws) that is embraced by the 
Indonesian people for the sake of religion concerned. 
Third, shariah (religious laws) does not require the 
help of state power to implement and maintain it, 
and therefore it can be run solely by every religion is 
concerned, as it becomes a personal obligation to God 
for every person practising their faith according to their 
respective religions. This means the law of a recognized 
religion in the Republic of Indonesia that can be run 
solely by their respective faiths in question (eg laws 
relating to worship, the law that generally manage the 
relationship with God) allows the adherents of that 
religion alone to carry it out according to their religious 
beliefs.33 
Related to the phrase “the State guarantees its 
citizens the freedom to run the service in accordance 
with the faith and belief ”as set out under Article 29(2) 
of the Constitution, in the chapter entitled ‘Religion’, 
a few observations should be made. First, Mohammad 
Hatta (the first Vice President) when explaining the 
meaning of the word “faith” contained in paragraph 
(2) Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, declared 
in 1974 that the meaning of the word “faith” in the 
forementioned article is a religious belief. The key is the 
word “it” contained at the end of paragraph 2 of Article 
29. The word “it” refers to the word “religion”, which is 
before the word “faith”. This explanation is quite logical 
because the word religion and faith are bound up in one 
sentence and placed under Chapter Religion.34 Bung 
33 Mohammad Daud Ali,  Asas-Asas Hukum Islam: Pengantar  Ilmu 
Hukum  dan Tata Hukum Islam di Indonesia. (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 
1991), p. 8
34 Mohammad Daud Ali, Asas-Asas Hukum Islam, p. 9.
Hatta’s description above, corresponds exactly with the 
description of H. Agus Salim, who stated in 1953 that 
at that time formulated the Constitution of 1945, no 
one among us who doubt that the basis of Belief in God 
Almighty was faith, religious beliefs.
Second, when giving an explanation of paragraph 
(1) Article 29 of the Constitution of 1945, in order to 
return to the Constitution of 1945 in advance of 1959, 
the Government of the Republic of Indonesia stated 
that paragraph (1) Article 29 of the Constitution of 
1945 is the basis of the legal life of the religious field. 
Third, in 1970, the words of Belief in God Almighty 
stated in Article 29 of the Constitution of 1945 is used 
as the basis and source of law in achieving justice in the 
Republic of Indonesia. According to Article 4 of Law 
14, Year 1970 in Indonesia justice must be done for the 
sake of justice based on the Belief in God Almighty.35 
Based on the description and explanation above, it 
can be assumed (and has become a reality) that Islamic 
law is constitutional and legal power in the Republic of 
Indonesia that can grow and develop and is sustained 
and accommodated in the “framework of shared social 
contract”/consensus Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. 
It was then elaborated through the Law No. 1 of 
1974 on Marriage, Law No. 7 Year 1989 on Religious 
Courts, Law Number 38 Year 1999 concerning Zakat 
(Charity) Management. Law no. 3 of 2006 concerning 
amendments to Law No. 7 Year 1989 on Religious 
Courts of Law. 50 of 2009 concerning the change of 
Law Number 7 Year 1989 on Religious Courts. Law 
no. 21 of 2008 on Islamic Banking. Likewise, some 
government instructions relating to the addition 
of Islamic law, also the emergence of Islamic Law 
Compilation which become guidelines for judges in 
special courts (Religious Courts) in Indonesia. It was 
referred to an aura of legal norms as stipulated in Article 
29 of the 1945 Constitution. 
Furthermore, in relation to Human Rights provisions 
entrenched in the Constitution of 1945, article 28 J 
states: 
“In exercising the rights and freedoms of each person 
shall be subject to the restrictions set by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights of freedom of others and to meet the demands 
of justice in accordance with considerations of morality, 
religious values, security and public order in a democratic 
society”. 
In Article 23(2) of the Law on Human Rights, it 
states:
“Every person is fre to have, express and distribute an 
opinion ccording to their conscience, orally and/or in 
35  Mohammad Daud Ali,  Asas-Asas Hukum Islam, p. 10.
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writing through print and electronic media with respect 
to religious values, morals , public order, public interest, 
and national integrity”.
It can be added also that under Article 31(3) of the 
Constitution, it is declared that the purpose of education 
(among others) is to enhance “faith” and “piety”. Also 
stated in article 5 that in the development of science 
and technology should be fixed in a frame to “uphold 
religious values”.     
So, it is not an overstatement to conclude that the 
validity and strength of the Islamic legal administration 
in the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) based on Pancasila 
and the Constitution is not lost and gone. Thus, it is 
normal also to say that Pancasila and the Constitution 
conforms and is not contrary to Islam.
Islamism versus Cultural Resistance
Islamic norms cannot be simply understood as 
moralistic as the philosophical conception of the rules. 
In other words, in the Indonesian context, Islamic law 
does not deal only with its content as what ought to 
be and as what it is written in the holy scriptures (The 
Quran and The Sunnah). It will never happen what 
is stated in the holy books applied literally. Despite 
Islamic law being recognized formally as a source of 
Indonesian law (as it is stated by some jurists), it should 
be indonesianized before it can be enforced in a real 
context and in practice. 
The hot debate during the 1970’s on the Bill of 
Marriage Law (later called as Law number 1, Year 
1974) between the defenders of religious marriage 
and secular marriage reflects these concerns. The 
defenders of religious marriage sharply refused the Bill 
as a stepping stone towards extreme secularization. On 
the other hand, defenders of secular marriage accused 
the former as the proponent of Islamism which would 
endanger the principle of Pancasila state and contradict 
to the principle of modernity and unity in diversity 
(pluralism).36 
In the end, the debate caused the revision of the Bill. 
The final Bill accommodated the demand of religious 
marriage proponents. However, as a consequence they 
will never accept the scriptural understanding of Islamic 
family law such as, the extreme superiority of husband, 
the non-restricted and easy polygamy, the unwritten 
marriage, the refusal of the Pancasila system of national 
36 See and compare Busthanul Arifin, Pelembagaan Hukum Islam di 
Indonesia: Akar Sejarah, Hambatan, dan Prospeknya, (Jakarta: Gema 
Insani Press, 1996); M. Syafii Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam di 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995); Anwar Harjono, Indonesia 
Kita: Pemikiran Berwawasan Iman-Islam, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 
1995); Departemen Agama, Kompilasi Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: Ditbinbapera, 2002).
law, especially in administrating and governing family 
law.
Another example of such interplay can be found in the 
case of Anti Pornography Law.37 When the law was first 
introduced, some Muslims and Indonesians hoped and 
feared that it could pave the way for the enforcement of 
an Islamic criminal law. However, in fact such hope and 
fear never eventuated. The core substance of the law is 
not the punishment for people engaged in pornographic 
activities. But the main substance is to punish those 
who intentionally spread pornographic material. Thus, 
in the case of Cut Yanti and Ilham (Ariel) Peterpan, 
who engaged in ‘illegal’ intercourse, the police cannot 
catch them due to the action.38      
The Law of Zakâh is another example. The law does 
not regulate and force a Muslim to do zakâh on the 
basis of a religious obligation. But the main substance 
is to manage and regulate Board of Zakâh (Badan Amil 
Zakat) to do the duty based on the principle of good 
governance: transparency, accountability, trustworthy.39 
Hence, Islamic law in the Pancasila state cannot be 
perceived as solely a normative and fixed set of rules; 
its existence is exclusively within the framework and 
legitimacy of Islamic legal scripture. To be a workable 
set of norms and legal source, Islamic law must interact 
and accommodate local wisdom as well as universal 
values, integrated within Pancasila. Any effort to apply 
Islamic law by emphasizing its scriptural character will be 
faced and challenged hardly by cultural resistance. The 
islamization of Indonesian law will not automatically 
tend towards Islamism. Indonesian democratic culture, 
its inclusive state ideology (Pancasila) and the plural 
orientation of its society will remain as the strong barrier 
for refusing Islamism.         
Closing Remark
Tracing the original concept of Islamic political 
vision concerning the promulgation of shariah indicates 
that the superiority of shariah cannot be implemented 
without forming Islamic state. However, in reality this 
concept is illusory and has no empirical evidence of its 
realization. The creativity of the Indonesian Muslim 
community to reconcile Islamic doctrine with local 
wisdom and secular values (Pancasila) produces a model 
37 Undang-undang Nomor 44, Tahun 2008 tentang Pornografi.
 38 See and compare Yanti Muthmainnah, "UU Nomor 44 Tahun 
2008 Tentang Pornografi, sebuah Kemunduran", March 26, 2010; 
www.komnasperempuan.or.id; Jaksa Tolak Pembelaan Ariel Peterpan, 
hokum.tvOnenews.tv/berita/view/47278/2011/01/17/jaksa_tolak_
pembelaan_Ariel_Peterpan_tvOne 
 39 See and compare, Undang-undang Nomor 38 Tahun 1999 
Tentang Pengelolaan Zakat; www.dompetdhuafa.or.id, For the new 
version of the Law, see DPR sahkan RUU tentang Zakat, Infak, 
Shadaqah (1/11/2011), www.detiknews.com. 
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of cultural legacy. Hence Islamic law is not to be seen 
as an antithesis of Pancasila. On the contrary, they can 
interact each other resulting in the interdependent 
enrichment and development of Indonesian national 
law. []
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